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Abstract
We provide direct evidence on the impact of asymmetric information on both
financing and operating activities through a study of credit evaluations of microfinance
institutions (MFIs). We employ a regression discontinuity model that exploits
the eligibility criteria of an evaluation subsidy offered by a non-profit consortium.
Evaluations dramatically cut the cost of financing. This effect is strongest for commercial
lenders and for short-term MFI-lender relationships. The impact of evaluations on the
supply of finance is mixed. Evaluated MFIs lend more efficiently, extending more loans
per employee.
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Introduction
Asymmetric information plays a prominent role in modern theories of corporate finance,
but empirically analyzing and assessing the impact of informational frictions has proven
to be difficult. Credible exogenous information proxies are hard to find, and there are
relatively few natural experiments that result in significant shifts in the information
environment. As a result, in contrast to the significant and well-established stream of
theoretical work on asymmetric information and financial contracting, empirical research
in this area is still in a somewhat early stage of development (recent papers include
Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000), Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004), Acharya and Johnson
(2007), Karlan and Zinman (2008), and Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini (2008)). This
paper provides an empirical analysis of the effects of asymmetric information on both
financing and operational activities through a study of microfinance institutions (MFIs),
lending organizations based in emerging economies that provide small loans to relatively
poor clients.1 Our central strategy is to analyze a plausibly exogenous shock to the MFIs’
information environment by exploiting the impact of a program offered by the non-profit
Rating Fund to subsidize MFI credit evaluations. Restrictions in the eligibility criteria
for the Rating Fund subsidy allow us to implement a regression discontinuity model
that assesses the causal impact of credit evaluations. Viewing these evaluations as a
means for reducing information problems, we consider the effects of credit evaluations
by rating agencies on the cost of funds for MFIs. The Rating Fund program also allows
us to investigate the relationship between the quality of publicly-accessible information
about MFIs and their operating efficiency.
The microfinance setting is particularly appropriate for the study of the effects
of information asymmetries on financing and investment for three reasons. First,
information frictions are likely to play an especially important role in raising the
1Estimates place the size of the global microfinance industry at $15 billion (Consultative Group to
Assist the Poor (2004b)) and the number of borrowers in the range of 50 million (Consultative Group
to Assist the Poor (2004a)).
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costs of finance in emerging industries and economies. In markets with less-well-
established institutions and weaker regulations, adverse selection considerations will
make it expensive for firms to raise funds and may restrict growth. We should
therefore expect that information asymmetries would be especially salient in the young
microfinance industry, which makes loans almost exclusively in less developed countries.
Second, MFIs play a financial intermediation role in their local economies that
is quite similar to that played by banks. Understanding the impact of information
asymmetries about financial intermediaries is important because frictions restricting
the supply of financing to these intermediaries can quickly impede the flow of credit
throughout the economy, as recent events have brought into relief. Last, the Rating Fund
subsidy offers an unusual and specific shock to the level of information asymmetries that
we can make use of to draw clear inferences in our empirical analysis.
The Rating Fund program provided a substantial co-payment to eligible MFIs
that sought an evaluation after May 2001. The eligibility criteria involved strict cut-offs
for minimal asset sizes and maximal average loan sizes. Our empirical approach is to
measure the discontinuous financing and operational changes experienced by a given MFI
precisely as it crosses the boundaries into (or out of) eligibility; we essentially contrast
the MFI as it just meets the eligibility criteria with the same MFI (in a different year)
as it falls just outside the criteria. We view the ratings subsidy program as essentially
creating a supply of new information about eligible MFIs. It is clear that MFIs (and firms
in general) choose whether to seek credit evaluations, so it may be difficult to draw causal
inferences from observed correlations between credit ratings and the financial activities
of an MFI. We show, however, that crossing into eligibility for the Rating Fund program
led to a significant increase in the probability that an MFI was evaluated. This enables
us to use crossing into eligibility as an instrument for evaluation, thereby avoiding
issues surrounding the endogenous choice by an MFI of whether to be evaluated. In
essence, the Rating Fund offered MFIs an opportunity to make a subsidized investment
in transparency.
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Our data provide loan-level information on the rates lenders charge MFIs. Using
the instrumenting strategy, we find that evaluations dramatically reduce the cost of
finance for MFIs. The interest rate paid by a given MFI to a fixed lender decreases by
550 basis points after an evaluation (the mean interest rate in the sample is 800 basis
points). Our regression discontinuity instrumenting approach allows us to interpret
this effect as causal —by reducing information asymmetries, credit evaluations make
financing much less expensive for MFIs.
The benefits of evaluations vary across different segments of the MFI industry.
MFIs receive funds from both non-commercial (e.g., governments or aid agencies)
and commercial (e.g., banks or commercial funds) sources. We find that evaluations
have a particularly strong effect in reducing the costs of financing from commercial
lenders, which is consistent with the idea that these lenders are more sensitive to credit
assessments of MFIs. We further show that evaluations do not have any significant
impact on the rates charged by long-term lenders to a MFI, but they substantially reduce
the rates charged by recent lenders. This suggests that the information asymmetries
resolved by the credit evaluations are more useful to lenders who have only been dealing
with the MFI for a short time.
While credit evaluations clearly reduce the price of financing for MFIs, the evidence
for their impact on the quantity of finance supplied is mixed. We find that evaluations do
not significantly increase the amount of loans that MFIs receive from outside creditors.
Our empirical approach allows us to assess the impact of asymmetric information
on not only financing but on the operational activities of MFIs, as well. We are thus able
to offer some direct evidence on the real effects of asymmetric information. Evaluated
MFIs increase the number of clients per credit officer. Our results indicate that relieving
information problems can significantly enhance operational efficiency (Bernardo, Cai,
and Luo (2004) and Marino and Matsusaka (2005)).
To gauge the robustness of our results, we consider an alternate specification in
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which we instrument for the presence of an evaluation after the initiation of the Rating
Fund using an indicator for whether an MFI met the program eligibility criteria prior
to the announcement of the fund. It is clearly implausible that MFIs manipulated their
characteristics to be be eligible for the subsidy before there was any knowledge of the
Rating Fund. Using this instrument we find confirming evidence that the Rating Fund
increased the probability of an evaluation for subsidized MFIs and that evaluations led
to reduced financing costs and more clients per credit officer.
Our findings relate to the recent literature showing the relevance of ratings for
firms’ financing (Cantor (2004), Kisgen (2006), Odders-White and Ready (2006) and Sufi
(2009)). In contrast to Sufi’s (2009) finding in his sample of large U.S. firms that ratings
increased the supply of finance and had no significant impact on price, we show that for
the MFIs we study credit evaluations significantly reduced the price of financing while
having a mixed impact on quantity. These varying results may be driven by differences
between the information environment faced by a large U.S. company versus that faced
by a relatively small MFI in a developing country. Our findings imply that the impact of
asymmetric information may be non-uniform across heterogeneous settings. Our work
also indicates that evaluations serve to change the way MFIs operate, which suggests an
on-going role for evaluators in improving performance.
We present clear evidence that rating agencies promote microfinance, and in
this way we contribute to the large and growing general microfinance literature (e.g.,
Brau and Woller (2004), Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), Karlan (2005),
Khandker (2005), Bubna and Chowdhry (2007) and Karlan and Zinman (2009)). One
central issue in the microfinance literature is the tension between those focused on
securing the financial viability of MFIs and those who argue that emphasizing purely
financial goals will lead MFIs to depart from their basic social mission of reducing
poverty (Morduch (2000)). To address the issue of social impact, we analyze the effect
of evaluations on the average size of loans originated by MFIs. (This is a common
metric for social outreach, under the assumption that smaller loans are made to poorer
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clients.) We find no evidence that evaluations lead MFIs to concentrate their lending
in large loans to presumably wealthier borrowers- average loan size is unchanged after
an evaluation. Transparency in emerging markets may thus bring benefits to broad
sectors of the population. Our findings suggest that credit agency evaluations are likely
to promote the financial goals of MFIs without detracting from their social missions.
Our findings linking asymmetric information, third-party evaluations, the price of
credit and the operations of the firm have broad application in many areas of finance
beyond MFIs. This paper also provides a general insight into the substitutability of
lending relationships and credit ratings. Existing lenders acquire information through
relationships. Potential lenders acquire information through external institutions such
as credit rating agencies. This paper argues that new credit ratings can benefit new
lenders and lower the cost of financing supplied by these lenders. When the provision
of the new credit ratings is unexpected (as in our setting), the resulting competition
between new and existing lenders may benefit borrowers. On the other hand, the long-
run effects of credit ratings in potentially discouraging lending relationships may not be
wholly beneficial to borrowers, though this issue is outside the scope of this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the empirical
setting and the data we use in the study. Section 2 provides an overview of the Rating
Fund. The empirical specification for our tests is given in Section 3, and Section 4
discusses our results. Section 5 concludes.
1 The Global Microfinance Industry
A. Background 2
Microfinance is a collection of practices built around providing small loans and
2This section is based on conversations with industry experts, participation in an MFI evaluation
meeting, and online reports issued by MicroRate, the MIX Market, and the CGAP. For an excellent
survey see Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005).
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accepting small saving deposits. Although traditional money lending has existed for
centuries, the banking-like industry in which a microfinance institution (MFI) serves as
a financial intermediary between owners of capital and needy borrowers is a relatively
recent phenomenon that is expanding at a fast pace in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe,
and Latin America. This industry is the focus of our study.
Microfinance institutions have both important similarities and differences from
traditional banks. On the one hand, MFIs raise funds, evaluate clients, grant loans,
and collect payments with interest, all of these being essential banking activities. On
the other hand, the loan-making processes, the client bases, the sources of funds, and
the organizational forms of MFIs are quite different from those of global banks and
even local banks in developing countries. Below we describe some of the most salient
distinguishing features of MFIs.
A.1. MFI Products
MFIs provide small loans to both fund microenterprises and to directly finance
consumption. The supported microenterprises typically have one employee (the owner)
and may engage in small-scale retail sales (e.g. food vending or clothes selling),
light manufacturing (e.g. production of handcrafts), services (e.g. bicycle repair) or
agriculture (e.g. poultry raising) (Ssendi and Anderson (2009)). Some small businesses
with multiple employees also receive microfinance backing. The direct consumption loans
are made to individuals to finance the purchase of durables, to pay for children’s tuition
or to fund home improvements (McIntosh, Villaran, and Wydick (2008)). Business and
household loans are both central components of microfinance, with the relative weighting
between the two varying across MFIs and regions (Johnston and Morduch (2007)). These
microenterprise and microcredit loans are often made to very poor borrowers, and this
market segment has typically been considered unattractive by traditional banks. Overall,
however, repayment rates in microfinance have been quite high (Morduch (1999)); in our
data, which we discuss in detail in Section 1.C below, we find that the median portfolio
quality (the proportion of the loan portfolio that is less than 30 days overdue) is 0.95.
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In addition to the small average loan size, a second distinctive characteristic of
microfinance loans is that, unlike bank loans, they are mostly made with little or
no collateral (Johnston and Morduch (2007)). One mechanism sometimes used as a
substitute for collateral is group lending in which borrowers (perhaps all drawn from a
rural village or urban neighborhood) assume responsibility for each others’ loans. Recent
evidence, however, suggests that group lending may be no more effective in reducing
defaults than standard individual lending, even in the absence of physical collateral
(Gine´ and Karlan (2008)). MFIs have also extended their activities from loan-making to
the provision of insurance against catastrophes or poor weather (Gine´, Townsend, and
Vickery (2007)).
A.2. Sources of Capital
The financing of MFIs differs from that of banks in two main respects. First, MFIs
do not rely much on demand deposits. In our data, the mean ratio of demand deposits to
assets is only 0.08 and the median is zero. Second, the debt financing of MFIs is provided
by non-commercial lenders in addition to the usual commercial sources. Non-commercial
loans are supplied by development agencies, governments, co-operatives and other MFIs.
Important non-commercial financing sources include the Inter-American Development
Bank and the World Bank. Non-commercial loans typically have a “social” flavor —
the loans are designed to help less developed countries and regions achieve growth and
poverty reduction.
Commercial loans are supplied by commercial funds, global banks and local banks.
Some prominent sources of commercial funding include BlueOrchard (a microfinance
investment firm headquartered in Switzerland) and the Global Commercial Microfinance
Consortium (a microfinance fund launched by Deutsche Bank in 2005). As we discuss
below in Section 1.C, commercial funding has significantly increased in importance
recently. There is a growing interest among commercial investors and global banks
in investing in microfinance for reasons beyond charity, as documented by Mattha¨us-
Maier and Von Pischke (2006). There is a sense that capital is scarce in the developing
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world, and that investments there should earn higher returns (de Mel, McKenzie,
and Woodruff 2008); as a result, MFIs are increasingly seen as commercially sound
investment prospects.
A.3. Organizational Forms, Regulation and Compensation
MFIs may be either for-profit or not-for-profit entities. Non-profit MFIs are
essentially non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with philanthropic goals that
specialize in the provision of finance to the very poor. For-profit MFIs are owned by
shareholders and governed by boards of directors. While this distinction seems quite
clear, it is nonetheless the case that for-profit MFIs often maintain a sense of their social
mission and not-for-profit MFIs are aware of their need to achieve financial sustainability
in order to continue to perform their functions (Dorado and Molz (2005)). Even for-profit
MFIs have a broader sense of their social goals than most local banks.
MFI regulations differ significantly across countries.3 Typically, MFIs that do not
fund themselves with deposits are not subject to regulations or disclosure requirements,
while deposit-taking MFIs may be treated like banks. In some cases (e.g. Bolivia), MFIs
have been brought into the regulated banking sector with a specialized set of guidelines.
In other jurisdictions (e.g. Colombia), even large MFIs function as unregulated NGOs
(Loubie`re, Devaney, and Rhyne (2004)).
In the development stage of the MFI industry in the early 1990s incentive schemes
for managers were quite rare, but they have become increasingly popular over the last
decade. Individual credit officers now typically receive monetary rewards for meeting
benchmarks along a number of dimensions, including average collection rates, value of
outstanding loans and number of clients. Socially-oriented MFIs tend to place a greater
emphasis on the number of clients relative to shareholder-owned MFIs. Some MFIs
also make use of team or branch-based compensation methods and institution-wide
profit sharing has become more common. Managerial incentive schemes have become
3See the database at http://www.microfinanceregulationcenter.org for a summary.
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especially popular in the more commercialized microfinance markets in Eastern Europe
and Latin America (McKim and Hughart (2005))
B. Existing research
The explosive growth of microfinance is reflected in research. For example,
Brau and Woller (2004) classify over 350 microfinance papers into six themes:
financial sustainability, products and services offered, management and development,
client targeting, policy and regulation, and social impact. Despite its breadth,
previous research on microfinance is limited when compared to research on financial
intermediation mostly because of its descriptive focus. For example, recent large-
sample studies have documented the existence of profits (Cull, Demirguc¸-Ku¨nt, and
Morduch (2007)) and a positive link between MFI performance and good macroeconomic
conditions (Ahlin and Lin (2006)). A new stream of work, however, is using microfinance
as a setting for randomized experiments aiming to address pending issues in economic
research (e.g., Kaboski and Townsend (2008) and Karlan and Zinman (2009)). While
some of these papers study information asymmetries and credit conditions, their focus
is typically on the small borrowers who form the the client base of MFIs rather than on
the MFIs themselves and how they are financed.
The work presented here extends the existing research on microfinance in several
new directions. First, to our knowledge this is the first paper to empirically study the
funding of MFIs in relation to information asymmetries. The microfinance literature has
paid little attention to the liability side of MFIs (Jansson (2003)), and while previous
work has described how MFIs get external ratings (Gutierrez-Nieto and Serrano-Cinca
(2007)) and whether those ratings relate to funding (Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008)),
we are the first to confront information asymmetries directly and to offer causal evidence
on this issue. Second, we explore how information asymmetries influence the pricing
of capital received by MFIs at the level of each loan and funding relationship. This
micro level of observation is unusual not only in microfinance but also in the general
financial intermediation literature, as well (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 2002). Third,
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this paper explores how information asymmetries affect the real operation of MFIs.
Beyond insightful case studies on the management of microfinance (e.g., Armendariz de
Aghion and Morduch (2005), chapter 10), limited large-sample evidence exists on how
MFIs operate to achieve efficiency. Fourth, we contribute to the current debate on the
commercialization of microfinance by investigating whether MFIs stray from their social
missions once information asymmetries are mitigated.
C. Data
Our main data source is a database of audited financial statements and selected
operating variables on MFIs provided to us by MicroRate. Occasionally featured in
industry publications (e.g., Stauffenberg and Abrams 2007) and general interest reports
(e.g., The Economist, 5 November 2005), the data have been collected and maintained
systematically by MicroRate, the oldest microfinance rating agency in the world, but
never opened to research before. The data cover 138 MFIs over the period 1997–2008, as
of 19 February 2009. MicroRate carries out both qualitative evaluations and quantitative
ratings, visiting MFI headquarters and branches to gather information. All covered MFIs
were evaluated and, in the latest years, assigned a quantitative rating by MicroRate at
least once during the sample period. The data are presented mostly in a semester
(6 month) basis. In the periods after an evaluation, MicroRate continues collecting
information from each MFI, validating it for consistency and standardizing variables
across MFIs in the database.4 There are 1,380 MFI-period observations in total. The
MFIs are drawn from 31 countries in Africa and Latin America.
The composition of the database shows a growing number of MFIs over the years.
For example, the number of MFIs in the sample is 58 in 1997 and 127 in 2007. This
trend could reflect the growth of the sector through entry, as the founding year of MFIs
ranges from 1981 to 2008. Although we can only observe exit from the database and
4As described by Ahlin and Lin (2006) and Cull et al. (2007), an alternative database on MFIs is
publicly available at the Mix Market (themix.org). Besides differences in coverage and depth, MicroRate
guarantees the attributes of consistency and standardization hard to find in self-reported data.
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not exit from the market, the age of an MFI is an important indicator of survival and
success, and we will use it in the analysis of lending relationships and pricing.
One key aspect of MicroRate’s database is the uniform expression of all variables
not only within each MFI over time but also across all MFIs in the sample. For example,
all audited financial statements are expressed in dollars and follow specific expression
guidelines provided by MicroRate to each MFI, corroborated later by MicroRate’s
analysts.
The database provides audited information on both the financing and lending
activities of the MFIs.5 Table 1 shows some summary statistics. The median portfolio
of loans given by an MFI is $4.67 million, and the median amount of financing received
by the MFIs in a given semester is $3.32 million. The median size of a loan originated by
an MFI is $590, and the median number of clients served by an MFI in a given semester
is 12,950. As shown in Figure 1, the amount of lending per MFI and the number of
clients per MFI both increased substantially during our sample period. The roughly
ten-fold growth in the average number of clients per MFI from 1997 to 2006 is indicative
of the dynamism of the MFI sector.
Because we observe each loan received by the MFIs, we are able to subdivide
total financing of MFIs into non-commercial loans (supplied by development agencies,
governments, co-operatives and other MFIs) and commercial loans (supplied by
commercial funds, global banks and local banks). The median amount of commercial
financing over the full data set is $0.33 million. As shown in Figure 2, however,
commercial financing has grown dramatically over time both in absolute value and as a
fraction of total funding. In 2007, the median commercial financing was $2.7 million.
5MicroRate’s data on MFI liabilities are especially interesting in the context of a vast microfinance
literature that has paid little attention to the capital structure of microfinance institutions, as pointed
out by Jansson (2003).
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2 The Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund
The Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund was launched by the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) in
May 2001 to promote the rating of microfinance institutions (MFIs). (The European
Union later joined the fund in 2005.)6 The fund was designed to encourage greater
transparency in performance reporting by MFIs, with the broader goal of increasing the
supply of commercial funding to the MFI industry.
The Rating Fund subsidized credit risk ratings supplied by a set of rating agencies
from an approved list. (Some other services, such as assessments of whether an MFI met
the expectations of its donors, were also subsidized.) The subsidies were on a declining
scale: the initial rating was subsidized 80%, the second rating was subsidized 60% and
the third rating was subsidized 40%. The subsidies also had caps that varied slightly
across regions. For example, the initial rating cap was $8,000 in Latin America and the
Caribbean and $10,000 in Africa. The subsidies were significant relative to the cost of a
rating. For example, MicroRate’s evaluations cost no more than $15,000.
The subsidy was limited to three ratings per MFI. MFIs that had received subsidies
prior to the opening of the Rating Fund could still apply for the full slate of three
subsidies, on the same terms as MFIs that had not previously been rated. The Rating
Fund was quite popular: before closing at the end of 2007, the fund had subsidized over
400 reports. Of the 338 evaluations performed by MicroRate, 123 were subsidized by
the Rating Fund.
2.1 Eligibility Criteria
Only MFIs satisfying the following criteria could apply for subsidies:
1. The MFI must have total assets between $300,000 and $30 million. For Latin
6The description of the Rating Fund in this section is drawn from ratingfund.org.
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American (excluding the Caribbean) MFIs, the lower bound on assets was
$500,000.
2. The MFI must have an average outstanding loan size of less than $2,000. For Latin
American and Caribbean MFIs, the maximum average loan size was $3,000.
While a small number of exceptions for marginal cases may have been made to
these criteria to include additional MFIs, officials at the Rating Fund confirmed to us
that the guidelines for eligibility were generally followed.7
3 Empirical Specification
Our tests focus on the impact of evaluations on the activities of MFIs. We analyze
whether the provision of information via an evaluation leads to different financing and
operational policies by MFIs. Specifically, we estimate equations of the following form:
MFIcharacteristici,t+1 = α+ β ∗ (evaluatedit) + γ ∗ controlsit + δi + λt + ²it, (1)
where MFIcharacteristicit is some attribute of MFI i in period t, evaluatedit is an
indicator for whether MFI i was evaluated in period t, controlsit is a vector of controls,
δi is an MFI fixed effect, λt is a year fixed effect and ²it is an error term.
MFIs choose whether or not to seek an evaluation. The endogenous quality of
evaluation provision therefore makes it inadvisable to estimate equation (1) via ordinary
least squares (OLS). For example, suppose that we consider the relationship between the
7MFIs typically hold loans and other assets that are denominated in non-dollar currencies. The
CGAP standard for evaluating MFI grant applicants is to apply free market exchange rates for purposes
of currency conversion. Average annual exchange rates are applied to income statement entries and
year-end exchange rates are applied to balance sheet items (Isern, Abrams, and Brown 2008). The
scope for MFI manipulation of exchange rates to artificially meet the eligibility criteria is thus quite
limited.
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amount of financing an MFI receives and whether or not it has been recently evaluated. It
may well be the case that MFIs that have experienced recent success both seek additional
financing (to continue their growth) and choose to be evaluated (because they prefer to
be evaluated during successful periods); it is also possible that firms engage in rating
shopping (e.g., Skreta and Veldkamp 2009). We might therefore observe a simultaneous
correlation between the provision of financing and an evaluation, but this correlation
would not show that evaluations actually lead to more financing in a causal sense.
In order to address this endogeneity concern, we propose a regression discontinuity
approach.
3.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
The Rating Fund subsidy is large relative to the cost of an evaluation, so eligibility
for the subsidy should be expected to increase the probability that an MFI pursues an
evaluation. Moreover, MFIs that have total assets and average loan sizes just within
the eligibility criteria will be able to access the subsidy, while MFIs with either total
assets or average loan sizes just outside the criteria will not be able to use the subsidy.
If the probability of an evaluation is continuous in assets and average loan size (in
the absence of the subsidy), then any jump in the use of evaluations precisely at the
eligibility boundaries may be attributed to the causal impact of the subsidy. As in
a standard regression discontinuity design, this allows for consistent estimation of the
effect of evaluations (Hahn, Todd, and Klaauw (2001)).8 Our setting differs only in that
there are multiple relevant discontinuities. Specifically, following the criteria in Section
2.1, we define the following indicator variables:
8A recent application of the regression discontinuity approach in finance is found in Sufi and Roberts
(2009).
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IL =

1 if avg. loan size ≤ $2, 000 in the MFI-year (Latin American MFIs)
1 if avg. loan size ≤ $3, 000 in the MFI-year (non-Lat.Am. MFIs)
0 otherwise
(2)
IA =

1 if assets ≥ $500, 000 in the MFI-year (Latin American MFIs)
1 if assets ≥ $300, 000 in the MFI-year (non-Latin American MFIs)
0 otherwise
(3)
IT =
{
1 if observation follows May 2001
0 otherwise
(4)
The Rating Fund subsidy will have an effect only in MFI-years for which all these
indicators are positive,9 so we can use these three discontinuities (in average loan size,
asset size and Rating Fund period) to instrument for the endogenous variable evaluatedit.
For each MFI-year, we define L to be average loan size minus the boundary described
in (2) and A to be the asset size minus the boundary given in (3). We estimate
MFIcharacteristici,t+1 = α + β ∗ (evaluatedit) + ν1IAIL + ν2ILIT + ν3IAIT (5)
+
4∑
j=1
ωLj L
j +
4∑
j=1
ξLj ILL
j +
4∑
j=1
ωAj A
j +
4∑
j=1
ξAj IAA
j
+γ ∗ controlsit + δi + λt + ²it,
and
9There are few MFIs that cross the upper $30 million asset bound in our data, so we make use only
of the lower bound and exclude MFIs with more than $30 million in assets.
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evaluatedi,t = α
′ + β′ ∗ IAILIT + ν ′1IAIL + ν ′2ILIT + ν ′3IAIT (6)
+
4∑
j=1
ωLj
′
Lj +
4∑
j=1
ξLj
′
ILL
j +
4∑
j=1
ωAj
′
Aj +
4∑
j=1
ξAj
′
IAA
j
+γ′ ∗ controlsit + δ′i + λ′t + ²′it.
That is, we instrument for evaluatedit using the triple-discontinuity indicator
IAILIT . We estimate this model using 2SLS (two-stage least squares) with robust
standard errors that allow for arbitrary correlations over time for each MFI. (That
is, we cluster at the MFI level.) We essentially use the regression discontinuity approach
to generate an instrument for the 2SLS estimation.
This approach generalizes to multiple discontinuities the models of Card, Dobkin,
and Maestas (2004) and Matsudaira (2008). The specification allows the probability
of evaluation to be continuous in assets and average loan size, with the shape of the
probability function permitted to be different on either side of the various eligibility
criteria. (No time polynomials are included because they are subsumed in the yearly
fixed effects.)
Our 2SLS regression discontinuity model exploits only the impact on a given MFI of
crossing the precise eligibility boundaries during the Rating Fund period. The inclusion
of the polynomial controls ensures the estimation picks up only the discontinuous effect
on the MFI of just meeting the eligibility criteria relative to just falling short of the
criteria. Only MFIs that cross the eligibility boundaries contribute to identification —
the other MFIs are used as controls. While there may be trends that had differential
effects on various sectors of the MFI industry over the sample period, our empirical model
analyzes the role of evaluations by focusing on the discontinuous impact of crossing the
specific Rating Fund eligibility boundaries. It is implausible that any such impact was
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driven by anything other than the Rating Fund subsidy itself.
It is certainly the case that MFIs can influence their level of assets and average loan
size, but this potential for manipulation (e.g., to meet the program criteria) does not
invalidate the regression discontinuity design. As long as the manipulation is imperfect
and noisy (which seems quite reasonable to assume in this setting, given that the data
are audited and eligibility is influenced both by free market currency exchange rates and
by the actions of the MFI’s borrowers, which the MFI cannot completely control), the
regression discontinuity model is identified (Lee (2008)).
4 Results
4.1 Testing the Instrument
We begin by analyzing whether an MFI was more likely to receive an evaluation after just
crossing the eligibility boundaries. That is, we estimate equation (6) of the regression-
discontinuity model. Data is available for 925 MFI-period observations. (In all tests
we use the complete sample for which data is available.) In the first column of Table 2
we report results from regressing a dummy variable for whether the MFI was evaluated
during the current period on the triple discontinuity instrument and the full set of
controls. The controls include the asset and average loan size polynomials (to the
fourth degree), the indicators for asset, loan size and time period eligibility and their
interactions with the polynomials, leverage (total book liabilities over total book equity),
the ratio of demand deposits to total assets, the ratio of credit officers to total staff, MFI
dummies and year dummies. The estimation is via OLS, with robust t-statistics clustered
at the MFI level reported in parentheses.
We find that the triple discontinuity enters equation (6) significantly with a t-
statistic of 3.72. MFIs that fell just within the eligibility requirements have a probability
of evaluation that is 0.311 higher than those that fell just outside the requirements. This
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is quite a large increase in probability relative to the mean evaluation probability of 0.25
and suggests that the Rating Fund was quite important in promoting the overall use of
evaluations by MFIs.
In the second column of Table 2 we display the results from a regression model
that is identical to the previous one except that the polynomial controls are extended
to the fifth degree. The estimated coefficient of 0.311 and t-statistic of 3.75 are very
similar to those in the fourth degree model, demonstrating the robustness of our first
finding. These results provide evidence that the Rating Fund subsidy indeed increased
the probability of an evaluation for MFIs that met the asset and loan size criteria.
4.2 Evaluations and Pricing: Loan-level Analysis
In this section we consider the impact of evaluations on the terms of the financing offered.
We analyze loan-level data that describe the interest rates paid by MFIs to their various
lenders. We make use of MFI-lender pair fixed effects to analyze the effect of a credit
evaluation on the rate paid by an MFI to a specific lender. While this specification
resembles previous work analyzing loan-level data (e.g., Petersen and Rajan 2002), our
use of pair-level fixed effects goes beyond lender or borrower characteristics to isolate
linear relationship-level unobserved heterogeneity. We express interest rates in dollar
terms, using forward exchange rates from Datastream to convert rates from loans priced
in other currencies.
We consider the impact of evaluations on loan pricing, taking into account features
of the loan and the nature of the relationship between the MFI and the lender.
Specifically, we regress the interest rate on an indicator for whether the MFI was
evaluated in the previous period, the loan amount (in logs), an indicator for U.S. currency
loans, an indicator for short-term (less than one year) loans, the age of the MFI, the
length of the relationship (i.e., number of semesters in which the lender has lent to
the MFI), MFI-lender pair fixed effects and year fixed effects. The estimation is via
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OLS, with robust t-statistics clustered at the MFI-level reported in parentheses. In this
preliminary regression we simply include the evaluation dummy itself, setting aside for
the moment endogeneity issues.
The results presented in the first column of Table 3 indicate that an evaluation
is associated with an insignificant effect on the interest rate paid. There is, of course,
significant selection in the process of seeking an evaluation. Perhaps only MFIs with
improving prospects seek evaluations or, on the contrary, perhaps evaluations are only
sought by MFIs in trouble who require outside validation. The insignificant raw partial
correlation between evaluations and subsequent interest rates is difficult to interpret
and may be driven by the qualities of the MFIs seeking evaluations rather than by
a direct causal impact of the evaluations themselves. To address this potential issue,
we adopt the two-stage regression discontinuity strategy described in Section 3.1 and
estimate (5) and (6) where the dependent variable of interest is the rate paid by the
MFI for its financing.10 The results from the first-stage regression (6), detailed in the
second column of Table 3, indicate that subsidy eligibility is significantly associated
with the use of evaluations. Our instrumented estimate of the impact of evaluations on
interest rates is given in the third column of Table 3: we find that evaluations have a
negative and significant effect on rates. The magnitude of the effect is quite large: an
evaluation in the previous semester reduces the rate on the loan by 550 basis points, a
large drop relative to the 800 basis point average rate across all loans. As the clients
of microfinance institutions are sensitive to the terms of the loans they receive (Karlan
and Zinman 2008), our results suggest a key role for information production in lowering
the cost of credit.
The triple discontinuity feature of the Rating Fund eligibility conditions limits the
10Our two-stage estimation for Table 3 does not follow the usual specification of a 2SLS design
because in this case we use controls from the past and the present to explain the dependent variable in
the present (i.e., interest rate), and it would be incorrect to use variables from the present to instrument
for the endogenous variable of the past. So the models will instrument for evaluation lagged using only
lagged variables in the first stage, introducing the contemporaneous variables in the second stage along
with the instrumented variable and the other lagged variables.
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extent of our graphical analysis, as we cannot visualize four-dimensional graphs. Figure
3, however, offers a partial illustration of our empirical design for the case of asset size,
making use of equation (3). Around the eligibility zone, there is a sharp decrease in the
average interest rate paid by MFIs to their lenders for those observations that barely
pass the eligibility threshold, as compared to those that barely fail to pass it. Relative
to the average interest rate of 0.08 (as expressed in decimals), the figure shows the large
economic impact of evaluations.
4.3 Evaluations, Financing Terms and Cross-Sectional
Characteristics
The results in Table 3 establish that evaluations reduce the rates paid by MFIs for
financing. In this section we analyze for which MFIs the impact of evaluations is
greatest. We split the sample into loans provided by commercial lenders (i.e., global
and local banks and commercial funds) and non-commercial lenders (all other sources).
As displayed in the first and second columns of Table 4, evaluations significantly reduce
rates for both classes of lenders, but the effect is much larger for commercial lenders. This
suggests that the information effects of evaluations are more important for commercial
lenders, who are likely to be more sensitive to the profitability of the loan than the non-
commercial lenders. Given the increasing role of commercial lenders described in Figure
2, the effects of evaluations on commercial lending rates are likely to be particularly
important in the future.
We also split the sample into those MFIs that were founded before 1997 (the sample
start period) and those that were founded in 1997 and thereafter, and we regress the
interest rate paid by the MFI to its lender on an indicator for whether the MFI was
evaluated in the previous semester and the full set of controls (including MFI-lender
pair fixed effects) and use the regression discontinuity instrumenting strategy as before.
As we show in the third and fourth columns of Table 4, evaluations significantly reduce
rates for older MFIs. While this result is consistent with previous findings on firm age as
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a key covariate for debt characteristics (e.g., Faulkender and Petersen 2006), we would
have expected that young MFIs benefit more from an evaluation, conditional on their
credit quality being good. Because these qualities may only be observable to insiders in
“soft information” banking, we expand our tests to look more carefully at age from the
standpoint of a loan relationship.
We now divide the sample into loans made in the context of long-term (five semester
or longer) and short-term (four semester or shorter) relationships between MFIs and
their lenders. One hypothesis is that evaluations are more important in reducing rates
in short-term relationships, because information asymmetries are much stronger in these
relationships. An alternative hypothesis is that lenders in long-term relationships may
be able to capture information rents and charge higher rates (Sharpe (1990) and Rajan
(1992)) and that an increase in information supply via an evaluation may serve to
particularly reduce the rents enjoyed by these lenders. As we show in the fifth and
sixth columns of Table 4, evaluations have a much stronger effect in reducing rates in
short-term relationships. This is consistent with the idea that these lenders can make
use of the information in the evaluations to reduce the financing lemons cost.
4.3.1 Financial Rating
Beginning at the end of 2002, MicroRate included in its evaluations a quantitative rating
of an MFI, on a scale from zero to nine.11 We now consider the impact of this rating on
the interest rate charged by estimating equation (5) with interest rate as the dependent
variable, replacing the evaluation dummy with the credit rating granted by MicroRate.
In untabulated results we do not find a significant coefficient on the financial rating. We
are unable to instrument for the precise rating granted by MicroRate, so it is difficult to
offer a clear interpretation of this finding. It may be, for example, that it is the initial
11MicroRate created a scale going from α++ to γ−, which is translated into nine to zero for the
empirical analysis performed here. The criteria for ratings are proprietary to MicroRate, and have
become part of a current discussion on how MFI risk should be assessed. We have ratings for MFIs in
2,427 loan transactions.
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evaluation that the market views as especially informative and that refinements of the
rating methodology are less influential (or are perhaps anticipated).12
The basic intuition from the theoretical information literature is that it is the
presence of information asymmetries that generates frictions. Evaluations reduce these
asymmetries and thereby minimize the credit market distortions, even if it is the case
that the information in the reports is, on average, neither good nor bad. Simply by
providing investors with verified data and expert assessments of MFIs (members of a
young and unfamiliar sector of the financial market), credit evaluations are able to reduce
the cost of funds for microfinance.
4.4 The Real and Financial Effects of Evaluations
4.4.1 Quantity of Financing and Demand Deposits
The results in Table 3 show that evaluations reduced the price of financing for MFIs.
We now consider the impact of these evaluations on the financing of MFIs and test the
hypothesis that evaluated MFIs will receive more financing. We expect that any changes
in financing policies by MFIs will occur at some point subsequent to being evaluated,
and thus all the results we present describe financing two semesters after an evaluation.
(Results at leads of three and four semesters are very similar.) In the first column of
Table 5 we display the results from regressing the ratio of future short-term debt to assets
on the instrumented evaluation variable and the full set of controls described above. The
estimation is via regression discontinuity 2SLS. We find an insignificant (t-stat=-0.02)
coefficient on the instrumented evaluation dummy. As detailed in Table 5 column 2, we
also find that evaluations (instrumented) have an insignificant (t-stat=-1.17) effect on
the future long-term debt to asset ratio; there is no clear evidence that evaluations have
a meaningful effect on the quantity of financing received by affected MFIs.
While external financing in the form of loans is the main source of financing for the
12Tang (2009) discusses the effects of market expectations on the impact of credit rating changes.
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MFIs in the sample, they also make some use of demand deposits (the mean deposits
to assets ratio is 8%). We regress the ratio of deposits to assets on the instrumented
evaluation dummy and the usual controls. As displayed in the third column of Table 5,
evaluated MFIs receive significantly more demand deposits (t-stat=3.18).
These findings indicate that the primary effect of evaluations is to decrease the
price of external loan financing, while leaving the quantity of external loan financing
substantially unchanged and increasing the amount of deposits. Overall, these results
contrast with the finding of Petersen and Rajan (1994) that small business lending
relationships mainly lead to greater provision of financing with only a small impact on
credit pricing. The primary impact of evaluations on microfinance institutions is to
reduce to cost of financing.
4.4.2 Number of Clients
In this section we consider the impact of evaluations on the operational efficiency of
MFIs. In particular, controlling for the number of credit staff, do evaluated MFIs
deal with more clients? A regular regime of evaluations may encourage MFIs to
professionalize and to perform more efficiently as they will be subjected to on-going
scrutiny by an outside party. That is, evaluations may serve to offer a form of market
discipline. Even though it is not clear that the reduced cost of funds associated with
evaluations will increase efficiency (indeed, the opposite may be the case), evaluations
may have a direct impact on MFIs: evaluated MFIs may understand that details on
their operations will now be shared with the market and may therefore take care to
improve their performance.
As previously, we consider outcomes two semesters in the future, and results are
similar for three and four-semester leads. We regress the log of the number of MFI clients
on (instrumented) evaluation and the standard controls (which include the number of
credit staff). The regression results presented in the fourth column of Table 5 show that
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evaluations significantly (t-stat=2.37) increase the number of future clients.
As a related test, we regress the number of MFI clients per credit officer on
(instrumented) evaluation and the usual controls. We find, as described in column
five of Table 5, that evaluations lead to significantly (t-stat=2.03) more MFI clients per
credit officer. These results show quite clearly that evaluations lead MFIs to make more
efficient use of their credit personnel.
Our results on how information asymmetries affect the market expansion
of financial intermediaries have broad implications, with particular importance in
microfinance. While recent work (de Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008) suggests
that the high returns of microenterprises in developing countries are due to the lack of
capital in credit markets, our unique contribution is to document a specific channel for
the expansion of microfinance operations.
4.5 Robustness: Eligibility Prior to the Rating Fund
The analysis in the previous sections is subject to the criticism that MFIs may exert
control over their total assets and average loan size and this control may undermine
the exogeneity of an MFI’s eligibility for the Rating Fund. As we discuss in Section
3.1, as long as this control is not perfect and admits some noise, Lee (2008) shows that
the regression discontinuity design is not invalidated. Nonetheless, in this section we
consider an alternate specification to which this concern does not apply.
We propose an alternate 2SLS model in which we consider whether, in December
2000 (before the advent of the Rating Fund), an MFI met the subsequently announced
eligibility criteria for the Rating Fund subsidy. (For three MFIs without data in
December 2000, we use the June 2000 values.) Specifically, we re-estimate the base
model, replacing the loan size and asset eligibility indicators (as described in equations
2 and 3) with indicators for whether the MFI met the Rating Fund criteria in December
2000. We then estimate (5) and (6) via a panel 2SLS regression, replacing the asset and
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loan size variables with their values in December 2000 and clustering at the MFI level.13
Our identification strategy is therefore to analyze the impact of the Rating Fund
subsidy by contrasting the behavior before and after the initiation of the Rating Fund of
the MFIs that met the asset and loan size criteria in December 2000. MFIs that did not
meet the asset and loan size criteria in December 2000 simply help to better estimate the
coefficients for the full set of controls. The Rating Fund subsidy is plausibly exogenous:
the fund was set up, and the eligibility criteria were established, at the initiative of the
funding agencies largely without the involvement or lobbying of MFIs.14
It is clear that MFIs did not manipulate total assets or average loan size to meet
the program criteria before the Rating Fund was announced. This alternative approach,
however, only allows us to make use of variation in the December 2000 data. This has
two implications. First, we are restricted to analyzing only those MFIs that existed
in the data in December 2000. Second, the December 2000 data will only serve as a
reasonable proxy for eligibility for a short window around the initiation of the Rating
Fund. We analyze a three-year window from December 2000 to December 2003.
We begin by testing the instrument. We estimate (6) in the loan-level data using
total assets and average loan size values in December 2000. (The regression includes the
usual controls including year and MFI fixed effects). As shown in the first column of
Table 6, MFIs that met the eligibility criteria just before the Rating Fund was announced
are significantly (t-stat=1.68) more likely to be evaluated after its inception. An eligible
MFI has a probability of being evaluated that is 0.242 higher than a non-eligible MFI.
This first-stage result supports the use of the eligibility in December 2000 instrument.
We then consider the impact of evaluations on interest rates. We re-estimate
the interest rate regression (including loan characteristic controls and MFI-lender pair
effects) and find that evaluations (instrumented by the prior eligibility) significantly (t-
13We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
14Our interviews with Rating Fund officials and experts clearly indicated that the launching of the
Rating Fund was external to the action of MFIs.
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stat=-3.59) reduce the rate paid by the MFI, as shown in the second column of Table
6. For this specification, we find that an evaluation reduces the rate by 0.093, an even
larger effect than we found in the base specification.
The prior eligibility instrument significantly (t-stat=4.06) predicts evaluations in
the MFI-level analysis as well, as displayed in the third column of Table 6. With respect
to the quantity of financing, the evidence using this instrument is mixed: short-term
debt over assets is estimated to decline after an evaluation, while demand deposits over
assets shows no significant change (results shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table
6, respectively). In untabulated results, we find that evaluations decrease the ratio of
long-term debt to assets. Taken together with the insignificant debt findings and the
positive demand deposit result in Table 5, the evidence on the effects of evaluations on
the supply of finance is weak and mixed.
Using prior eligibility as an instrument, we show in column six of Table 6 that the
impact of evaluations on the number of clients is positive and significant (t-stat=1.69).
The ratio of Clients per Credit Officer also significantly increases (t-stat=4.92) after
an evaluation, as described in Table 6, column 7. This provides additional support to
the finding in Table 5 and suggests that operational efficiency does improve after an
MFI is placed under the additional scrutiny of evaluations. Overall, the results from
the previous eligibility instrument support the argument that the Rating Fund subsidy
encouraged evaluations and that these evaluations led to less expensive credit and more
efficient operations by MFIs.
4.6 Evaluations and MFI Outreach
The evidence discussed above makes clear that evaluations reduce the costs of financing
for MFIs and lead them to make loans in a more efficient manner. One central issue in
the study of microfinance, however, is the tension between a purely financial assessment
of MFIs as lending institutions and an appraisal of the broader social function of MFIs
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in relieving poverty. The results in Sections 4.2, 4.4 and 4.5 support the argument
that evaluations improve the financial viability of MFIs. The larger concern underlying
donors and social investors’ support for initiatives like the Rating Fund subsidy, however,
is that MFIs play a role in poverty reduction.
One central measure of the social effectiveness of an MFI is the extent of its
outreach efforts in lending to poorer borrowers. A typical measure of this outreach is
the average size of a loan extended by the MFI. MFIs with smaller average loan sizes
are typically judged to be better serving the least wealthy sector of society. While
evaluations may reduce the cost of finance for MFIs and encourage them to operate
more efficiently, evaluations may also drive MFIs to focus more on profitability and to
neglect their social missions. In particular, MFIs may make fewer small loans to poor
clients.
Our primary regression discontinuity 2SLS approach that exploits
contemporaneous eligibility is ill-suited for testing the outreach conjecture. Following
the Rating Fund eligibility criteria, that empirical design uses an MFI’s transition from
having an average loan size above $2,000 to having an average loan size below $2,000 as
one of the three discontinuities associated with a higher evaluation probability. In other
words, the regression discontinuity approach mechanically induces a correlation between
the instrument for being evaluated and an MFI’s average loan size.
The alternative specification using previous eligibility that we described in Section
4.5, however, does not suffer from this problem as the instrument is not determined by
subsequent changes in average loan size. The results in Table 6 establish that previous
eligibility predicts future evaluations (column one of Table 7 repeats the third column of
6 for clarity of presentation). In the second column of Table 7, we display the results from
the regression of future average loan size expressed in logs on evaluation (instrumented
via eligibility in December 2000). Average loan size is unaffected (t-stat=0.02) following
an evaluation.
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Our findings contribute to the study of the institutional mechanisms that encourage
the integration of global capital markets. An important body of research has studied the
gradual integration of equities in emerging economies into the world stock market (e.g.,
Bekaert and Harvey (1995), de Jong and de Roon (2005)). Less attention has been paid
to the integration of global banking markets. Our results suggest that rating agency
evaluations can play a central role in granting MFIs (an important source of financing in
many developing economies) less costly access worldwide commercial sources of credit,
without impairing their social function.
4.7 Costs and Benefits of the Rating Fund Subsidy
The evidence we have presented suggests that the Rating Fund subsidy brought
large benefits to participating MFIs, as subsidized evaluations led to significantly less
expensive financing and improved operating efficiency. Though we do not have the
market value information that would allow for a precise quantification, the MFIs that
received the subsidy appear to have experienced important gains. In fact, it is reasonable
to ask, given the scale of the benefits and the moderate size of the subsidy, why MFIs
did not simply seek evaluations on their own, prior to the opening of the Rating Fund.
We think three points help to explain the importance of the Rating Fund. First,
the advantages of evaluations may simply not have been well-known ex ante. MFIs may
not have had enough information to correctly surmise that evaluations could be very
useful. By subsidizing 80% of the cost of the first evaluation, the Rating Fund essentially
removed most downside risk for the MFIs and thereby encouraged them to proceed.15
Second, there were likely some unobserved costs of incentivizing MFIs. The Rating Fund
incurred additional expenses to make MFIs aware of the existence of the subsidy (e.g.,
15In support of this argument, Meloni and Suazna´bar (2005) show that MFIs were particularly likely
to use the Rating Fund to support first reports, as opposed to updates. That is, the Rating Fund
apparently was most helpful in establishing the value of ratings for MFIs that had not used them
before. In general, the net benefits of microfinance are difficult to forecast ex ante (Kaboski and
Townsend (2008)).
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advertising and marketing of the Fund). These transaction costs (including search and
education costs) were not internalized by MFIs but rather by the Rating Fund. It is,
therefore, reasonable to believe that the subsidy may have really amounted to more than
100% of the list price of an evaluation when those transaction costs are added to the
nominal subsidy. Last, it is worthwhile to note that for it to be effective, the subsidy
need only have influence at the margin. In their (unobserved) cost-benefit analysis, MFIs
may have been barely averse or indifferent to pursuing evaluations by themselves. The
absolute value of the subsidy, therefore, is not the central issue; the question is whether
we observe a change in marginal behavior triggered by the incentive, which we do.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide direct evidence on the effects of asymmetric information on
both financing and operating efficiency by analyzing the impact of credit evaluations in
the microfinance industry. Evaluations reduce information asymmetries but seeking an
evaluation is, in general, an endogenous choice for a firm. We exploit a targeted subsidy
offered by the non-profit Rating Fund and make use of a regression discontinuity design
to measure the impact of an exogenous decrease in the asymmetric information about a
given MFI. We first show that subsidized MFIs are more likely to receive an evaluation.
Using an instrumenting approach, we then demonstrate in a loan-level analysis that
evaluations lead to much lower financing costs. These benefits are particularly large for
MFIs that borrow from commercial lenders and in short-term MFI-lender relationships.
Evaluations do not, however, generate more funding to MFIs. In a study of the
operational effects of evaluations, we find that evaluated MFIs invest more efficiently:
they have higher client to credit officer ratios. Our main findings are confirmed in a
second specification in which we use an MFI’s eligibility for the Rating Fund prior to its
announcement as an instrument for evaluation. Further, we show that evaluated MFIs
do not originate larger loans on average, which we interpret to show that evaluations do
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not diminish the social impact of MFIs.
Asymmetric information can lead to distorted investment strategies within firms.
We provide evidence that credit evaluations, and the accompanying capital market
discipline, can have a significant effect on MFIs. Evaluations lead MFIs to make better
use of the human resources of their credit officers. More broadly, this suggests that
financial market scrutiny may lead to more productive and successful investment by
firms. In terms of real consequences, the impact of asymmetric information in facilitating
investment inefficiencies may be as important as its effect in hindering the provision of
finance.
Taken together, our findings suggest that credit evaluations are a simple and
inexpensive mechanism for reducing credit costs for microfinance and for bringing it
into the mainstream of the worldwide financial institution industry. Evaluations hold
the promise of linking some of the world’s neediest borrowers to the rich resources of
global capital markets.
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Figure 1: The Operation and Investment of Microfinance Institutions
This figure shows the average number of clients per MFI in the sample, and the average portfolio of loans extended per
MFI in the period studied, expressed in millions of dollars.
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Figure 2: The Funding of Microfinance Institutions
This figure shows the average funding received by MFIs from non-commercial lenders (i.e., government, development
banks, NGOs, cooperatives, and other MFIs) and commercial lenders (i.e., commercial funds, global banks, and local
banks) in the period studied.
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Figure 3: Interest Rate and Asset Size around Eligibility Border
This figure shows the average interest rate paid by MFIs on their total loans outstanding and their asset size in millions
of dollars around the eligibility border defined in equation (3), plotting actual and linearly fitted values.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
The data are from MicroRate. The unit of observation is a microfinance institution (MFI) at a given period, mostly end
of semester. Evaluation is a dummy indicating whether MicroRate performed an evaluation of the MFI. Eligibility is the
interaction of two variables: whether the Rating fund is active (May 2001 onwards), and whether the MFI complies with
the two size requirements for the subsidy: assets between $0.5M and $30M (Latin America) or $0.3M and $30M (rest of
the world), and an average loan size of less than $3K (Latin America) or less than $2K (rest of the world). Dollar amounts
are in $000 and expressed in logarithms. The weighted average interest rate is calculated over all loans outstanding in
the liabilities of the MFI at the end of period. Cash and cash equivalents is a ratio over assets. Fixed property and long
term investments is a ratio over assets. Average loan size refers to the loans made by MFIs to their clients. Portfolio
quality is the fraction of the portfolio composed of loans with less than 30 days past due; leverage is total liabilities over
total equity; demand deposits are expressed as a ratio over total assets; long term debt is expressed as a ratio over assets;
credit staff is expressed as a ratio over total staff of the MFI.
Variable Median Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. n
Evaluation (0/1) 0.00 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 1380
Eligibility dummy 1.00 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 1380
Required size dummy 1.00 0.66 0.47 0.00 1.00 1380
Rating fund period dummy 1.00 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00 1380
$ All Loans received (log) 8.11 7.94 1.71 0.65 12.10 1094
Weighted averaged interest rate 0.08 0.08 0.06 -0.30 0.40 1094
Cash and cash equivalents 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.71 1380
Portfolio (in $M) 4.67 18.51 39.49 0.00 463.00 1380
Fixed property and LT investments 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.44 1376
Number of clients (log) 9.65 9.53 1.36 4.55 13.83 1274
Clients per credit officer 292.04 333.73 380.33 0.00 6234.53 1310
Average loan size (in $000) 0.59 2.55 52.02 0.00 1801.29 1296
Portfolio quality 0.95 0.85 0.28 0.00 1.00 1326
Leverage 2.07 2.35 2.04 0.00 27.83 1360
Demand deposits 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.00 0.92 1380
Long term debt 0.26 0.27 0.21 0.00 1.66 1380
Credit staff 0.44 0.45 0.13 0.03 0.91 1309
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Table 2: Triple Discontinuity in MFI Characteristics and Evaluations
The table presents regression discontinuity models of MFI evaluations. The unit of observation is an MFI at a given
period, mostly end of semester. Evaluation is a dummy indicating whether MicroRate performed an evaluation of the
MFI. Model 1 includes polynomials of fourth degree, whereas model 2 includes polynomials of fifth degree. The controls
are leverage, demand deposits, credit staff, and an unreported constant. t-statistics for heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by MFI are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable:
MFI evaluated (1/0)
OLS OLS
(2.1) (2.2)
Asset jump × Loan Size jump × CGAP jump 0.311∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(3.72) (3.75)
Asset jump (dummy) Yes Yes
Loan size jump (dummy) Yes Yes
CGAP jump (dummy) Yes Yes
Asset jump × Loan size jump Yes Yes
Asset jump × CGAP jump Yes Yes
Loan size jump × CGAP jump Yes Yes
4th-degree polynomial Assets Yes Yes
4th-degree polynomial Loan Size Yes Yes
4th-degree poynomial interacted with Jumps Yes Yes
5th-degree polynomial Assets No Yes
5th-degree polynomial Loan Size No Yes
5th-degree poynomial interacted with Jumps No Yes
MFI controls (dem.deposits, leverage, credit staff) Yes Yes
Fixed effects:
MFI Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
n 925 925
N clusters 124 124
***, **,* are 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by MFI.
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Table 3: Evaluations and Financing Terms
The table presents regression-discontinuity instrumental variable models of how evaluations affect the pricing of loans
obtained by MFIs. The unit of observation is a loan outstanding in the liabilities of the MFI. The dependent variable
is the interest rate of the loan expressed in dollars using the forward exchange rate from Datastream (World Markets /
Reuters) whenever available, or the perfect forecasting factor using realized future exchange rates. The age of the MFI is
measured in years. The relationship between the lender and the MFI is measured as the cumulative count of semesters
in which they had loans outstanding. The loan-level controls include loan amount in logarithms, loan maturity, currency,
as well as an unreported constant. Fixed effects for each MFI-lender pair and for each year are included. t-statistics for
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by MFI are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable:
Interest rate in decimal points
OLS RD-2SLS? RD-2SLS?
1st Stage 2nd Stage
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3)
Evaluationt−1 −0.012
(−1.56)
Evaluationt−1 (Instrumented) −0.055∗∗
(−2.52)
(Asset jump × Loan Size jump × CGAP jump)t−1 0.365∗
(1.95)
Loan amount (log) 0.002 0.002
(1.63) (1.40)
Loan is in U.S. currency −0.016∗∗ −0.014
(−2.38) (−1.25)
Loan is short term 0.002 0.003
(0.95) (1.19)
Relationship 0.002∗∗ 0.006
(2.06) (1.52)
Age of MFI 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002
(4.04) (0.85)
Asset jump (dummy)t−1 No Yes Yes
Loan size jump (dummy)t−1 No Yes Yes
CGAP jump (dummy)t−1 No Yes Yes
(Asset jump × Loan size jump)t−1 No Yes Yes
(Asset jump × CGAP jump)t−1 No Yes Yes
(Loan size jump × CGAP jump)t−1 No Yes Yes
4th-degree polyn. Assetst−1 No Yes Yes
4th-degree polyn. Loan Sizet−1 No Yes Yes
(4th-degree pol. interacted with Jumps)t−1 No Yes Yes
MFI-Lender Pair fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
n 10665 6322 6322
N clusters 114 105 105
***, **,* are 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Std. errors for t-stats. are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by MFI.
2SLS? models in this table omit loan-level variables in the 1st stage because they are posterior to Evaluationt−1.
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Table 7: Outreach Consequences of Information and Financing
The table shows how evaluations affect average loan size two periods into the future, replicating the primary specification
with two differences: (i) the asset size and loan size values imputed for equations (5) and (6) are those of December 2000
(or the latest period in 2000), that is, before the Rating Fund was announced; (ii) the period for the analysis is shortened
to a narrow window around the introduction of the Rating Fund, that is, from the second semester of 2000 to the second
semester of 2003. Note that the number of MFIs drops to those just affected at the moment of the introduction of the
Rating Fund, that is, those present in the data in 2000. t-statistics for heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
by MFI are in parentheses.
Dependent Variable:
Evaluation (1/0) Average Loan Size
RD-2SLS RD-2SLS
1st stage 2nd stage
(7.1) (7.2)
Asset jump2000× Loan Size jump2000× CGAP jump 0.702∗∗∗
(4.06)
Evaluation (Instrumented) 0.001
(0.02)
Leverage −0.013 0.025
(−0.70) (0.95)
Demand Deposits −0.043 −0.521
(−0.08) (−1.64)
Credit staff 0.902 −0.061
(1.20) (−0.23)
Asset jump2000 (dummy) Yes Yes
Loan size jump2000 (dummy) Yes Yes
CGAP jump (dummy) Yes Yes
Asset jump2000× Loan size jump2000 Yes Yes
Asset jump2000× CGAP jump Yes Yes
Loan size jump2000× CGAP jump Yes Yes
4th-degree polyn. Assets Yes Yes
4th-degree polyn. Loan Size Yes Yes
4th-degree pol. interacted with Jumps Yes Yes
Fixed effects:
MFI Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
n 269 247
N clusters 55 54
**,* are 5% and 10% levels of two-tailed tests.
t-statistics use robust standard errors clustered by MFI.
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